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ITIs well known that the forces of c9mpetition tend to direct individual
firms toward adopting methods of production that are in accordance
with relative resource scarcities. This proposition assumes a given
level of technological knowledge, that is to say, it assumes production
functions in which time does not figure as a variable.
The present paper examines the conditions under which inventive
activity, resulting in industrial innovations, i.e. in changes in produc-
tion functions, also becomes directed toward making this activity
accord with relative scarcities in the available factors of production.
But this theme will not be taken up immediately. First, I shall make
a few introductory observations concerning the directing mechanism
on a given level of technological-organizational knowledge, and then
some of the imperfections of this mechanism will be discussed. This
will clear the ground for an analysis of the problem of directed inven-
tions and innovations.
In Figures 1 and 2 the individual firm is faced with average and
marginal productivity functions for labor and for capital, respectively.
The "factors" measured along the axes are to be interpreted as the
current services of workers and of capital goods.
If Ow-i-- Or expresses the ratio of the wage rate to the market rate of
interest with which the firm is faced, the ratio of the labor input to the
capital input in the firm will be 0L1/0K1. The graphs do not in general
answer the question of the absolute quantity of the labor input and of
the capital input, since to assume one of the two inputs as given when
we solve for the other input would beg the question.
In the event of linear homogeneous production functions, the total
inputs in each firm are indeterminate unless a limitation is introduced
from the outside. For example, if capital is rationed to the firm at the
quantity OK1, or labor at the quantity 0L1, then the graph indicates
NOTE: I am greatly indebted to Charles J. Hitch and Richard R. Nelson for a discussion
of the first draft of this paper; to John H. Power, Arthur M. Okun and James Tobin for
valuable suggestions; and to Robert M. Solow for an exchange of notes which was
exceedingly illuminating to me. I made various revisions under the influence of the
comments received from these colleagues.
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the quantity of the nonrationed
constant-cost situations where, aside
input. But even in these
from an outside limitational
factor, the absolute size of the inputs is indeterminate, the graph will
correctly indicate the input-ratio in the firm which corresponds to any
given resource-price ratio (unless even with this input-ratio unit costs
exceed the product price, in which case the firm would, of course, be
out of business).
The directing mechanism in a competitive economy











production, or of a macro-economic excess demand for a factor of
production, on the relative factor prices with which the individual
firms are faced. These factor-price ratios shift in such a way as to
induce the firms to use input ratios consistent with the ratios of macro-
economically available supplies. Furthermore, the product-mix also
changes in the equilibrating direction. In the event that the production
functions are not linear homogeneous but of the kind to which
U-shaped average cost curves correspond, not only the input ratios but
even the absolute quantities of input in the individual firms become
determinate and this conclusion does not require introducing limita-
tional circumstances from the outside. This is because the upward
sloping range of the average cost curves always expresses the same sort
of deviation from linear homogeneity as the presence behind the
scenes of a hidden factor of production which is scarce and rationed to
the firm. This hidden factor eliminates the indeterminateness of the
absolute size of the labor and of the capital input. In the event of the
linear homogeneity the indeterminateness is a consequence of the fact
that if both the input of labor and that of capital are increased in the
same proportion the higher inputs have the same marginal produc-
tivity as the smaller inputs had earlier.
As to the imperfections of the mechanism, in a sense, monopoly
power and monopsony power may always be said to misdirect re-
sources. However, not all deviations from perfect competition lead to
an aggregative excess supply of factors of production, if by excess
supply we mean resources which are idle when their owners would
prefer to have them used at going prices. The deviations from perfect
competition which can lead to this particular result may be listed in
the following way.
1. The directing mechanism described earlier operates with lags.
Indeed, even to show conclusively that factor markets will be cleared
with a lag would necessitate spelling out dynamic sequences which
incorporate assumptions concerning the precise effects of the excess
demands and the excess supplies of a period on the price movements
from period to period. This is in essence the stability problem. Even if
one assigns high probabilities to the presumption that the directing
mechanism comes through, i.e. that it is not obviated by events
happening on the road toward market clearance, one should recognize
that the mechanism does not complete its workings instantaneously.
Lags may create underutilization.
2. Lasting rigidities of the money-wage and price level are quite
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likely to put Say's Law out of commission. It is necessary to eliminate
Say's Law from our analytical apparatus if imperfections of competi-
tion are recognized as causing downward rigidities in the money-wage
and price level, because Say's Law can be based only on the real-
balance effect, and this in turn presupposes perfect flexibility of the
general price level. In a non-Sayian world, unemployment of labor at
the existing level of money wages is a possibility even in the long run.
All that is required for such underutilization is that at the given price
level the demand for goods out of a full-employment income should
fall short of the full-employment supply of goods. If this situation•
arises the wage-price structure will fail to direct the entire labor force
into one or another occupation, and this deficiency of the market
process will be a consequence neither of a higher-than-equilibrium
real wage level nor of a deficient relative price structure or wage
structure. The deficiency will be a consequence of the fact that rates of
return on investment have become too low to induce an amount of
investment which would match the amount of savings at full employ-
ment. If now the general price level does not decline to the point where
a plentiful supply of real balances would saturate the demand for
liquidity, then the demand for goods does not rise to the level needed
for full employment. This is a "Keynesian situation" stated in terms
which take account of post-Keynesian contributions. A lowering of the
money rate of interest could help, but if the money rate has already
declined to a near-zero floor level, the system will necessarily tend to
an underemployment level.
In such a Keynesian situation there is an excess supply of labor, even
in the long run. An excess supply of capital does not persist in the long
run because, while capital may be in excess when a Keynesian situation
first develops, nonreplacement will gradually eliminate the excess
capacity. Nevertheless, even in the long run the potential full-employ-
ment supply of savings and of capital does stay in excess relative to the
full-employment demand for capital.
3. There may be underutilization of labor but not of capital also
because real wage rates are rigid downward at a level exceeding the
marginal productivity of the full labor force with the given capital
stock. In situations of this sort an equiproportionate reduction of
money wage rates and of prices would not help. An equiproportionate
reduction would indeed raise the money demand for goods. But in the
case we are now considering unemployment is not a consequence of
any insufficiency of demand for an increased output. With a more
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liberal credit policy (lower interest rates) the demand for goods would
at any event be sufficient for taking up a bigger output. In the case at
hand the potential full-employment supply of savings and of capital
would be no greater than the full-employment demand for capital (at
interest rates above the floor level). Such a potential excess supply at
full employment is not the reason why full employment is out of reach.
if full employment is nevertheless not achieved (and if this is not
simply a consequence of the lags in the adjustment process discussed
under 1 above), then the reason must be that the actual supply of
capital is insufficient to make the ruling real wage rate a full-employ-
ment equilibrium wage rate. Hence, the net capital formation which
takes place under these conditions of underemployment wherever the
propensity to save is positive, will automatically lead to full employ-
ment unless the actual real wage rate is gradually further raised or
unless other forces tend to reduce that level of the real wage rate which
is consistent with full-employment equilibrium. Such other forces may
develop from rapid population growth, from the presence of a scarce
hidden factor of production, and, as we shall see, from innovations
whose relative labor-saving character is very pronounced. If no forces
come into play which would reduce the real wage rate consistent with
full employment, then gradual capital formation will automatically
create full use, at any given real wage rate.
It is this last sentence which is not valid in the event that the under-
utilization is of the Keynesian variety discussed under 2 above. That
sentence draws the line between the two types of general unemploy-
ment. In the Keynesian case capital is too abundant relative to labor
in an economy in which the levels of money wage rates and of prices are
subject to a floor; in the other case labor is too abundant relative to
capital in an economy in which the level of real wage rates is subject to
a floor. A simpler but still adequate expression of this result is as
follows: in the Keynesian case the rate of return on investment would
have to be below a floor level in full employment, in the other case the
real wage rate would have to be below a floor level in full employment.
A Mechanism Directing the Relative Factor-Saving Effects of
Inventions
We now turn to the main theme of this paper which relates to the role
of inventions in creating or preventing the two types of maladjustment
described in the concluding paragraph of the preceding section. Any
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market mechanism which one would be willing to regard as directing
inventive activity into the correct channels would have to have the
property of guiding innovations (and thus the underlying inventions)
in a labor-saving direction if an abundance of capital relative to labor
is creating one of the two types of maladjustment, and of guiding
innovations in a capital-saving direction if a relative abundance of
labor is creating the other type of maladjustment.
At this point it is necessary to draw a distinction between the
quantity of innovating activity and its character (i.e. its relatively
labor-saving or relatively capital-saving character). Given all resource
inputs, the output and hence also the average productivity of each
factor input will be increased much or little depending upon the
quantity of innovating activity. For given resource inputs, the average
productivity of each resource (say, of labor and capital) is increased,
of course, in precisely the identical proportion, namely, in the pro-
portion in which total output increases. This is true regardless of how
relatively labor-saving or capital-saving the innovation may be (re-
gardless, say, of whether we are concerned with labor-saving automa-
tion devices or with a capital-saving move from cables to wireless
telegraphy). The answer to the question by how much the average
productivity of all resources increases depends for given inputs on the
quantity of innovating activity, not on its character.
On the other hand, the answer to the question of how innovations
influence trends in real wage rates relative to trends in rates of return
on investment depends on the relative labor-saving or capital-saving
character of innovations. This statement implies of course a macro-
economic way of looking at the matter. To an individual firm possess-
ing no monopsony power, factor prices are given. A relatively labor-
saving innovation induces such a firm to use more capital per unit of
labor, and a relatively capital-saving innovation induces it to use more
labor per unit of capital. But if innovations are adopted on a macro-
economic scale, then the factor-price ratios (and the relative factor
shares) change for any given total input of the factors of production.
We shall use the following definition: innovation A is more relatively
labor saving, and hence less relatively capital saving, than innovation
B if, for macro-economically given resource inputs, innovation A
reduces the relative share of labor more (or raises the relative share of
labor less) than does innovation B.' However, the observable trends in
distributive shares do not, of course, result exclusively from innova-
1Thisdefinition could, of course, be extended to a three-factor model.
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tions. They result jointly from innovations, from movements along
production functions, and from changes in the product-mix.
Both the quantity and the character of innovations were here defined
for given resource inputs. For the present purpose it is convenient to
use given inputs to mean the inputs actually undertaken.
If we further develop our definition of the character of innovations
in terms of the marginal productivity theory of distribution (Figures 1
and 2), then it is an essential corollary that we regard an innovation as
the less relatively labor saving (the more relatively capital saving), the
more it shifts up the marginal productivity function of labor relative
to that of capital. Since for given resource inputs the two average
productivity functions are shifted up in the same proportion, the
relative factor-saving effects are effects on the percentage gaps between
average and marginal productivities. This is in accordance with the
definition of "labor-saving" and "capital-saving" which was suggested
by Hicks in his Theory of Wages.
A NEGATIVE PROPOSITION
Coming now to the problem of market incentives for the correct
slanting of the relative factor-saving effects, we shall first formulate a
negative proposition, and subsequently replace it by a positive one
which rests on somewhat more complex but, we feel, also on more
realistic assumptions.
The negative proposition is that in the event of purely competitive
factor hiring, with no factor rationing to individual firms, the market
provides no incentive to seek for any given factor inputs one rather
than another distribution of the factor-saving effects. This proposition
assumes that the individual firm knows for what factor inputs it would
be using each available new technology, and that the firm has no
objective other than to maximize its profits. We also assume that the
cost of acquiring an invention which raises total output in a specific
proportion for certain inputs does not depend on whether the marginal
productivity of labor is increased in a higher proportion than that of
capital or vice versa. In other words, we are concerned here with the
question of economic bias, not with that of laboratory bias.
Assume that the firm has the conventional U-shaped cost curves
which it can try to lower by seeking new technological knowledge
either of a more relatively labor-saving kind or of a more relatively
capital-saving kind. The firm expects to earn extra profits, at least
temporarily, since the individual firm's ability to innovate does not
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alter prices, wage rates or rentals (say, the relatively high wage rates
and low rentals of advanced economies). While the excess profit
situation lasts, the following statements are valid, and they make up
our negative proposition. One, if with no innovation the firm would
have found it most profitable to produce a given output by using, say,
5unitsof "cheap" capital for each unit of "expensive" labor, then
raising the physical productivity of this specific combination by 10 per
cent gives more extra profits than would a 10 per cent productivity
increase for any other combination.2 Two, if it so happens that with the
same difficulty a greater product raising effect can be obtained for a
combination other than 5:1, then the other combination may, of
course, become superior, but there is no reason to assume that the firm
would have a predilection for making some other combination superior
to the combination 5:1. Therefore, the negative part of our conclusion
stands. If there exists no laboratory bias, then there exists no
systematic bias whatever (in other words, there is no reason to expect
systematic economic bias). Even without innovations, increasing
macro-economic labor scarcity leads, of course, to a movement toward
points of higher capital intensity. But given these points, there is no
further inducement to seek innovations of a more relatively labor
saving character.3
2Thisproposition is strictly valid (valid' in each individual case) only if the optimum
factor ratio does not depend on the scale of operations. If the optimum ratio does change
along the firm's cost curves, then the post-innovation output will be produced with a
factor ratio which is usually not identical with the ratio with which the same output
would have been produced earlier, nor with the ratio with which the actual pre-innovation
output was produced. But this introduces merely a random deviation from the negative
proposition of the text, since the optimum factor ratio may change either way along
various stretches of the cost curves. The reasoning in the present footnote does not point
to a systematic economic bias for the innovating process in general.
Takefor illustration the average capital-productivity function (APk) of a firm for a
given labor input, and denote several points on the abscissa which are close to each
other, as points K1, K2, K3, etc. These points on the capital axis stand for increasing
inputs of capital, and thus for rising capital intensity. Assume that the firm now operates
in K1, and that it anticipates a movement toward K2, K3, etc. This is the equivalent of the
assumption that the firm expects a rise in real wage rates relative to rates of return on
investment.
In these circumstances the firm does indeed have an interest in finding through innova-
tion a higher APk curve which in the next period lies above the present curve mainly in
the region around K2; and subsequently the firm will have an interest in producing a
further upward shift mainly in the region around K3. But there exists no presumption that
within these regions the firm would want to shift up the curve at one end in a higher
proportion than at the other end, Hence there exists no presumption that in the region in
which it will be operating the firm would want to make the elasticity of the higher APk
curve different from that of the lower one, i.e. that it would want to decrease the per-
centage gap between the average and the marginal productivity of capital, thus making
the more efficient technology also more "relatively labor-saving." Alternatively expressed,
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Figure 3 provides a further explanation of our negative proposition.
OR is the aggregate revenue function of the firm, 0C1 its pre-innova-
tion long run aggregate cost function, 0C2 its post-innovation long
run aggregate cost function. 0m1 is the pre-innovation profit maximiz-










Graphic Illustration of the Negative Proposition
m2
Output
inventions are capable of yielding a 10 per cent increase in the total
product for all conceivable factor mixes with which a given output
can be produced, then the optimum factor mix will be the same in P2
as it is in F1, except for the random qualification expressed in footnote
3. Before the inventions all other factormixes lay on higher cost
functions than 0C1, hence the other factor mixes stay handicapped
too under the improved circumstances. The argument applies also to
monopolistic selling as long as the ruling factor prices are given to the
when the firm is in K1 an effort is likely to be made to find for the next period a higher
APkcurvewhich is particularly high in K2; this changes the arc-elasticity of the APk
curve for the jump from K1 to K2 in one direction, but changes the arc-elasticity of the
curve for the jump from K2 to K3 in the other direction, and there exists no presumption
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individual firm while it is putting the innovation into effect. In the
event of monopolistic selling the OR line acquires a curvature.
The reader will remember that on the micro-economic level on
which we are analyzing the problem in Figure 3 (and Figure 4), the
test of the character of innovations is whether given all market prices
the individual firm is led to use more labor input per unit of capital (or
vice versa).But on a macro-economic level the test is whether the
factor-price ratios are changed in one direction or the other, for given
total macro-economic resource inputs. It is obvious that this is the
macro-economic equivalent of the foregoing micro-economic way of
looking at the matter.
Figure 4 provides an alternative illustration of the same negative
FIGURE4




proposition.In this illustrationall three isoquants relate to the
identical quantity of output. Isoquant I expresses the old technology,
while isoquants II and III express newly invented technologies.The
ruling factor-price ratio is expressed by the slope of the iso-cost line
connecting the axes. The conclusion here is that for the given output-
level technology IIIisoptimal, although technology II ismore
relatively labor saving. However, a rise in the relative price of labor will
make technology II optimal at a later date, provided that no new inven-
tion is made between now and then. This is because a steeper factor-
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at which it would reach tangency with isoquant III. We have here our
first reason for qualifying our negative proposition, and we are on our
way toward positive statements concerning a directing mechanism. It
was just shown that the more labor saving isoquant—i.e., isoquant
Il—becomes superior for a steeper iso-cost line (or factor-price ratio
line), and this qualifies our negative proposition for a reason that can
be expressed as follows.
The significance of the negative proposition formulated above is at
least somewhat reduced—and for some periods it may even be wiped
out—by the fact that when the relative scarcity of, say, labor is in-
creasing and factor prices shift correspondingly, certain new methods
which were discovered earlier can automatically become economical
even though previously they were uneconomical; and the new methods
which may qualify with a lag under this heading are necessarily
relatively labor saving. Through this mechanism growing relative labor
scarcity may conceivably result in a labor saving bias, even if all
factors are available to the individual firm in infinitely elastic supply.
Let us now go one step further. If the services of labor or of capital
are notininfinitely elastic supply to the individual firm, then it is not
enough to qualify our negative proposition concerning the existence
of a directing mechanism. In this case, the negative proposition loses
its validity completely.
Assume, for example, that the terms on which capital is available to
the firm become increasingly unfavorable as the borrowings of the
firm increase, while more labor of given quality is available on un-
changing terms. In these circumstances the firm does have incentives
to seek for the inputs of each period new technological knowledge of a
relatively capital-saving kind. In other words, the firm does have
incentives to seek improved methods which raise the marginal produc-
tivity of labor more than that of capital and thus raise the firm's
demand for labor more than its demand for capital. The firm will have
incentives to seek such relatively capital-saving innovations because a
rise in the price of capital is an effect which the individual firm must
take into account in its calculation. It is not merelyamacro-economic
phenomenon which happens if a great many firms increase their
demand for capital, but a phenomenon taking place even if the indivi-
dual firm alone acts to increase its input of capital. In contrast to this,
the macro-economic wage-raising effect of relatively capital-saving
innovations is a phenomenon which the individual firm has no reason
to take into account in its calculations and hence does not "hold
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against" this type of innovation. The contrary incentives develop if
labor is hired in monopsonistic circumstances while the supply of
capital is infinitely elastic to the firm. Graphs of the type drawn in
Figure 4 will show this up, provided the iso-cost lines are drawn with
the appropriate monopsonistic curvature.
Further, it is important to realize that if the firm size becomes
determinate not because of the U-shape, of the cost curve but because of
the rationing of one of the factors of production to the firm, this
implies an infinitely inelastic supply of that factor at the pre-innovation
input. Hence the incentive to raise the marginal productivity function
of this factor is smaller than the incentive to raise the marginal
productivity function of the other factor. In this case, too, our quasi-
monopsonistic results become established.
A POSITIVE PROPOSITION
Our positive proposition then is that a directing mechanism does come
into play as soon as factor scarcities are transmitted to the individual
firm by monopsony, or in some quasi-monopsonistic fashion (as in
the event of factor rationing which implies infinitely inelastic supply
to the firm). From this we may infer that a directing mechanism is
quite likely to come into play if the character of the innovations
"overshoots" strongly enough in one direction or the other. For, if
the innovating activity of a period is slanted strongly enough in a
relatively labor-saving direction then the demand for capital is quite
likely to rise fast enough to result in excess demand and thus, for the
individual firms, in difficulties of financing. For a sustained period the
market price of capital lags behind the price at which all the demand
would be satisfied. This expresses itself in the fact that the terms of
borrowing are made more onerous to the individual firm if it wishes to
acquire appreciably more capital than it already has. A monopsonistic
situation develops and innovating activity is guided in a more capital-
saving direction (which then puts an end to the monopsonistic situa-
tion). The effect of the innovations on the marginal productivity of
labor becomes more favorable.
On the other hand, if the innovations of a period overshoot far
enough in a relatively capital-saving direction, i.e. if it is primarily the
demand for labor which is increased, then the labor market is likely to
show signs of excess demand. For a sustained period the market price
of labor of various sorts lags behind the price at which all the demand
would be satisfied. In a sufficiently tight labor market—which is con-
182RELATIVE FACTOR-SAVING EFFECTS
sistent with a small degree of over-all unemployment—most individual
firms are aware of the fact that increasing the work force in their own
establishments requires hiring workers away from other employers on
terms more onerous than those implied in the concept of going wage
rates for given qualities of workers. This, too, creates temporarily
quasi-monopsonistic conditions but in the labor market rather than in
the capital market. Hence an incentive is created for seeking more
relatively labor-saving improvements. Under the influence of these the
marginal productivity of capital fares better, although it is conceivable
that within certain limits the effect on the rate of return on capital
is offset by a higher propensity to save and a higher rate of invest-
ment.
To put it briefly, monopsonistic awareness of factor scarcities is less
rare than is common lybelieved. Temporary monopsony does not even
require "large" firms in any reasonable sense of this word. Such a
condition merely requires firms that are large in relation to the markets
in which they hire, and acute scarcities may narrow these markets very
greatly. A rapidly rising macro-economic demand for a factor is
likely to create for a while monopsonistic awareness of relative
scarcities. Therefore a sufficient slanting ("overshooting") of innovat-
ing activity one way or another may very well lead to this same result.
If this is so, incentives are created for seeking innovations whose
character is more in accordance with the existing macro-economic
resources position.
A word should be added here about the role of monetary fiscal
policy. We said a moment ago that innovations which overshoot in a
capital-saving direction create a monopsonistically observable labor
scarcity, and that, therefore, such overshooting tends to be self-
correcting. It is necessary, however, to add that if this kind of over-
shooting lasts long enough, the labor scarcity disappears and the
directing mechanism breaks down. The reason is that a sufficiently
pronounced and sufficiently protracted weakness of the trend in rates
of return on investment (coupled with rigidities in the money-wage and
price level) leads to the Keynesian variety of unemployment. This
type of unemployment expresses the paradox that a relative labor
scarcity (insufficient marginal productivity of capital) may indirectly
result in an excess supply of labor. Once the paradox has developed
the directing mechanism is put out of commission. The mechanism
can be called to life again by policies which raise the level of effective
demand, i.e., eliminate the paradoxical excess supply of labor, and it
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is advisable to use such policies with moderation even at an early
stage to prevent the Keynesian paradox from developing.
Earlier we also said that overshooting in a labor-saving direction
tends to create a monopsonistically observable scarcity of capital
which should guide innovating activity into more capital-saving chan-
nels. In such circumstances government policy can play a harmful role
by making too ambitious efforts to eliminate the relative excess of
labor, i.e. by creating a monopsonistically observable scarcity of labor
as well as of capital. This last sentence involves, of course, a value
judgment because, while a government policy of the sort which is here
criticized would indeed weaken the directing mechanism, such a policy
could be said to accomplish socially desirable results directly, without
the guiding mechanism of the market. Nevertheless, the statement
will probably be acceptable to those who wish to aim at reliance on
market forces, coupled with corrective policies, rather than at a con-
dition of overfull utilization of all resources coupled with rather
comprehensive controls.
MACRO-ECONOMIC ELABORATION
The macro-economic elaboration on our theme will take its departure
from a more flexible variant of the Harrod-Domar type of approach.
This version which was used also in earlier writings of the present
writer will here be formalized somewhat further.
The Harrod-Domar type of approach places in the foreground a
macro-economic relationship expressed by the equation
dYdK
(1)
where Y is output or income, t is time, K is the capital stock, and sis
the average propensity to save (so that s= SIY, where S is the
aggregate saving of a period).
This relationship is intended to be a condition of dynamic equili-
brium (smooth or sustained growth), rather than merely an identity.





A more complete formulation would include further independent
variables in the production function 2, and also in the saving function
3.
We now turn to an essential point which conventionally receives
too little attention. The conventional, very rigid version of the Harrod-
Domar approach implies the following constraint:
dYY== constant (4)
The only reasonable interpretation of this constraint is that smooth
growth cannot continue in the event of a rising capital-output ratio,
i.e. of a falling Y/K, and that the case of a rising Y/K ratio may be
disregarded (perhaps because the equations are intended to formulate
the minimum conditions of smooth growth). In other words, the only
reasonable interpretation of (4) is to postulate, or to require for
smooth growth, nondiminishing returns to capital, in the sense of a
nondiminishing Y/K ratio. This point is rarely made clear in dis-
cussions based on equation (1) or on equivalents thereof.
What I consider to be a necessary (and for the present purpose,
adequate) relaxation of this approach—a more flexible version which
I have used in my earlier analysis of growth problems—has the
following main characteristic. The constraint expressed in (4) is re-
placed by the constraint:
YP
(4)
where P is the income going to the owners of capital (profit plus
interest), iTisthe rate of return on capital, andisthe minimum below
which ircannotdecline because of risk-premium requirements.
What I am suggesting here is that the constraint must be made to
relate not to the capital-output ratio, or to the Y/K ratio, but to the
algebraic product Y/K .P/Ywhich is the rate of return on capital.
Furthermore, the constraint should not postulate that in the economy
with which we are concerned, e.g., the American economy, F! Y,
is at a floor level below which it cannot be reduced; the constraint
should merely postulate that there exists a minimum requirement for
Y/K P/Y, at some level.
The concepts developed earlier can now be applied to this macro-
economic framework. We shall assume that in the kind of economy
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which we are studying the capital stock is rising at a greater pro-
portionate rate than the labor force, and that along given production
functions this would reduce Y/KWhetheralong given production
functions F! Y would rise, or fall, or stay unchanged depends on the
elasticity of substitution and is therefore not entirely certain.5 But
Y/K P/ Y would be declining. As for the effect of innovations, a
sufficient quantity of innovating activity would always prevent the
Y/K ratio from declining; and a sufficiently pronounced relatively
labor-saving effect of the innovations would always prevent the P/ Y
ratio from declining.
This last sentence concerning the effects of innovations has been
formulated in such a way as to take account of the fact that the
observable trends in Y/K, in F! Y, and in the algebraic product of
these (i.e. in rr), depend not merely on innovations but on the joint
effect of innovations, movements along nroduction functions, and
changes in the product mix.
As for the observable trends in these various ratios, the available
data for the United States show that in the long run the aggregative
Y/K ratio has not declined. Nor does this ratio show a falling trend in
some other countries for which we have data. This points to a sufficient
quantity of innovating activity to maintain, or even slightly to raise in
the long run, the average productivity of the factor of production
whose supply has been rising the most rapidly. Consequently, the
average productivity of the factors whose supply has been rising in
lesser proportion than that of capital shows a pronounced uptrend,
and innovating activity may be regarded as quantitatively sufficient
by reasonable standards.
The factor-saving effects have been distributed so that an appreciable
and consistent uptrend in real wage rates results, and at the same
time, that distribution probably results in a mild long-run lowering of
the rates of return on investment (although this lowering, or "down-
trend," does not show for all subperiods of reasonable duration which
can be distinguished in long-run materials). When allowance is made
for the labor income and profit income of the self-employed, the
This assumes thaton a given levelof knowledge the economies of scale would have
been exploited long ago.
It seems to me very likely that P/V woulddecline. For example, if the American
capital stock were doubled with absolutely no technological progress and no growth of
employment, the rateofreturn on capital would hardly be higher than one-half of its
present value, and wages would no doubt rise.
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relative share of labor has not changed much in the long run; it
probably has increased to some extent.
It is possible to conclude that in the long run the distribution of the
factor-saving effects has come out "just about right," in that rates of
return on investment have not declined to a level which would have
been too low for sustained investment activity. For the rest, the effect
of innovations, along with that of capital formation, has been to raise
real wages. in a sense, the innovations have been neither too capital-
saving nor too labor-saving. But we must guard against accepting the
(in this sense) correct results of innovating activity as a cogent proof of
the existence of the previously discussed directing mechanism.
That directing mechanism should come into operation whenever
the relative labor-saving effect of innovations overshoots to the point
where there develops "monopsonistic" awareness of a capital short-
age; and whenever the relative capital-saving effect of innovations
overshoots to a point where there develops monopsonistic awareness
of a labor shortage. While a directing mechanism of this sort is very
likely to set limits to the overshooting in either direction, I am not
familiar with observations which would establish the conclusion that
a somewhat more pronounced capital-saving effect than that actually
developed would have monopsonistically transmitted a chronic labor
shortage to the individual firm. Neither am I familiar with observations
which would establish the conclusion that a somewhat more pro-
nounced labor-saving effect than that which has developed would have
monopsonistically transmitted a chronic capital shortage to the
individual firm. To me it seems tempting to suggest that the kind of
directing mechanism outlined above has played a role in keeping the
relative factor-saving effects of innovations within bounds. Much
stronger claims could not be justified at present.
The alternative proposition which qualifies the negative proposition
illustrated by Figure 4 may conceivably point to a nonmonopsonistic
directing mechanism. One way of expressing this alternative proposi-
tion is to say that if, for the time being, a more capital-saving innova-
tion is neither better nor worse than a more labor-saving one, then, in
the absence of further inventions, the more labor-saving innovation
will later become superior.
Whenever the monopsonistic mechanism previously discussed or
this latter alternative adjustment process is at work, the characteristics
of technological change contribute to the avoidance of underutiliza-
tion. One disadvantage of basing economic development in primitive
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countries on Western knowledge isthat Western technological
progress seems to have adjusted to Western resource positions which,
of course, are different from the resource positions of primitive
countries. Thus, the present problem of primitive countries frequently
is to choose between a backward capital-saving technology and an
innovated Western labor-saving technology. A genuine adjustment
process in primitive countries would, on the other hand, make
innovated capital-saving technologies available to them.
COMMENT
EDWIN MANSFIELD, Carnegie Institute of Technology
In his present paper, William Feliner returns to a subject considered
in his book on economic growth.' He asks the following question:
What mechanisms exist in a capitalist economy to direct inventive
activity into the correct channels? If capital—or labor—becomes
relatively "abundant," are there market forces stimulating the search
for labor-saving—or capital-saving----inventions?
First, he considers a perfectly competitive economy and concludes
that no such forces exist. Next, he allows imperfections to be present in
the factor markets and points out that if these imperfections reflect
macro-economic scarcities, firms will have the incentive to seek out
inventions of the proper type. Then he goes on to suggest that this sort
of mechanism may have prevented innovations from becoming too
"capital saving" or too "labor saving."
Fellner's two central propositions seem formally correct. In a
perfectly competitive economy I can see no reason why a firm, in
searching for new methods, should prefer ones that are relatively
capital saving or relatively labor saving. What matters is the extent to
which profits will increase. Moreover, if there are imperfections in the
factor markets of the sort he assumes, it seems clear that firms will find
innovations of the proper type more profitable to install.
However, I think he seriously understates the significance of a
qualification he mentions. Although firms may have no preference for
inventions of the proper type, a "sufficient" quantity of such inven-
tions may be available as a by-product of past research efforts. In the
course of project research and other inventive activities, many bits of
'Trends andCycles in Economic Activity, NewYork, bit, 1956, pp.220—222.
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technical knowledge are unearthed that can only be applied economi-
calty under subsequent factor prices. Presumably, the extent of past
inventive efforts determines (at least in part) whether the supply of
such innovations is "sufficient."
Turning from Feliner's paper, I would like to describe briefly some
related work of my own. Part of a larger project on technical change
that I have been conducting,2 this work deals with the factors in-
fluencing a firm's spending on research and development. At this point,
only the first parts of this study have been completed. But the results
to date and the broad lines of the investigation may be worth
presenting.
I shall begin by presenting a very simple model to help explain the
short-term variation in a firm's expenditures On research and develop-
ment. Then I shall describe the results of some preliminary tests to
which it has been subjected. Finally, I shall outline how this simple
model fits into the overall study of R and D expenditures. Note at the
outset that the analysis applies only to industries whose R and D is
mainly privately financed (chemicals, petroleum, etc.) and that the
results so far are extremely tentative.
In its simplest form, the model assumes three things. First, it
assumes that a firm's managers, when they determine how much to
spend on R and D during the coming year, begin by taking this year's
expenditure as a base from which to figure. Second, it assumes that
they have some target percentage of sales in mind and that they apply
this percentage to their sales forecast for the coming year to obtain a
target figure for R and D expenditures. For the
1thfirm,let this percen-
tage beThird, it assumes that they set the R and D budget so as to
move a certain fraction of the way toward this target. For the 1" firm,
let this fraction be a12. Thus, if r.(t) is the i" firm's R and D budget for
year t, R.(t —1) is its actual expenditure in year t —1, and s(t)isits
sales forecast for year t,
r(t)= R(t—1) + — R.(t—1)]. (1)
These assumptions seem to accord at least roughly with the results
of various surveys. For example, the National Science Foundation,
having interviewed officials of about 200 corporations, concludes that
firms generally take existing expenditures as a base in formulating R
2Thiswork has been financed principally by a contract with the Office of Special
Studies of the National Science Foundation.
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and D budgets.3 It also finds that the most prevalent way in which
firms determine the "optimal" level of R and D expenditures is by
taking some percentage of sales.4 And it points out the value placed by
firms on the stability of their research organizations.5 Because of the
long-term nature of research projects and because changes in sales may
only be temporary, one would expect a12tobe considerably less than
unity.
If we go on to assume that the forecast sales equal the actual sales
and that the actual R and D expenditures equal the budgeted amount
in equation 1 plus a random error term,6 we have
R,(t) =R.(t—1) + —R.(z—1)] + z1(t),(2)
where S1(t) is the firm's actual sales in year t and z,(t)isa random
variable with zero expectedvalue.Letting=1—cc12and
=a11a12, wehave
R1(t) = —1) + + z.(t), (3)
and according to the model,
; (4)
Turning now to the matter of empirical testing, how well does
equation 3 fit the past behavior of various firms? Using pre-1957 data
for ten major chemical companies,7 I obtained least-squares estimates
of and The results—presented in Table 1—indicate that
equation 3 represents these data extremely well. The correlation
coefficients are generally 0.99 or higher. The estimates ofand
generally have the correct signs, they are generally of the expected
See Scienceand Engineering in American Industry, Final Report on a 1953—1954
Survey, National Science Foundation, 56—16, Washington, 1956, p. 46. My colleague,




6Theassumption that sales forecasts are perfect is clearly only a convenient first
approximation. Its effect is probably to bias the estimate of fl12 toward zero.
Thedata come from Charles Langenhagen, "An Evaluation of Research and
Development in the Chemical Industry," (unpublished M.S. thesis, Massachusetts
Institute of Technology, 1958). Included were all firms for which he presented exact
figures for twelve or more years, and for which corresponding sales figures could be
obtained. He obtained the figures through correspondence with the firms and through
annual reports and similar documents. Only the exact figures (not his estimates) are










De:erminatione flu P12 fin P12
Allied Chemical 11 —.55.74 .0093 .15 .0053 .98
American Cyanamid 20 — .41 .70 .0177 .12 .0059 .98
Atlas Powder 20 —.141.02 .0053 .15 .0039 .94
Diamond Alkali 15 —.36 .81 .0141 .12 .0039 .98
General Analine 11 1.66.75—.0027 .28 .0146 .75
Hercules Powder 25 —.27.88 .0095 .11 .0040 .97
Hooker Electrochemical 19 —.02.48 .0139 .13 .0019 .99
Minnesota Mining 19 —.23.77 .0131 .22 .0069 .99
Monsanto Chemical 24 — .35 .65 .0158 .14 .0036 .99
Union Carbide 12 —.921.10 .0029 .11 .0045 .99
SOURCE: Charles Langenhagen, "An Evaluation of Research and Development in
theChemical Industry,"UnpublishedM.S.thesis,MassachusettsInstituteof
Technology, 1958,andMoody's Industrials.
°Thenumber of years for which data could be obtained for 1), and S(t).
The years are consecutive and end with 1956 in all cases but Diamond Alkali and Union
Carbide where the last year is 1955.
bIncomputing the regression, all variables were measured in units of millions of
dollars.is the intercept of the regression—which according to the model should be
zero. Although no formal tests were carried out, it seems unlikely that many of these
estimates would be statistically significant. However, it is noteworthy that in almost
every case the estimate is negative.
The square of the coefficient of correlation.
order of magnitude, and despite relatively few degrees of freedom,
they are generally statistically significant.8
How well does equation 3 forecast the expenditures on R and D of
these firms? Taking each firm's sales in 1957 as given and using the
estimates ofand fi12 in Table 1, I used equation 3 to forecast each
firm's 1957 R and D expenditures. (I did not have data on their R and
D expenditures in later years.) The results—shown in Table 2—
indicate that the forecasting errors for individual firms are generally
from 5 to 10 per cent and that for the group as a whole the error is only
about 2 per cent. This is considerably better than the performance of
three standard naive models.9
8Inthree cases, the estimates violate the inequalities in equation (4) but in every case
the standard errors are so large that this could well be due merely to sampling fluctuations.
The three naive forecasts are (1) that expenditures next year will equal those this
year [i.e. that (2) that expenditures next year will differ from those this
year by the same amount that expenditures this year differed from those last year [i.e.
that and (3) that expenditures next year will differ by the
same per cent from those this year as this year's expenditures differed from those last
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TABLE 2
COMPARISON OF ACTUAL AND FORECAST R AND D EXPENDITURES
TEN MAJOR CHEMICAL COMPANIES
(millions of dollars)
Company Actual Forecast
Allied Chemical 17.5 18.7
American Cyanamid 22.7 24.7
Atlas Powder 2.8 2.4
Diamond Alkali 3.9 4.2
General Analine 5.8 5.1
Hercules Powder 10.2 11.3
Hooker Electrochemical 2.8 2.6
Minnesota Mining 16.4 14.1
Monsanto Chemical 22.7 21.1
Union Carbide 55.0 52.4
Total 159.8 156.6
SOURCE: see Table 1. For each firm, the actual and forecast expenditures refer to the
last year for which Langenhagen gives exact figures. For Diamond Alkali and Union
Carbide, this is 1956. For the others it is 1957.
Thus, on the basis of the little evidence available so far, this model—
highly simplified though it is—seems to fit past data quite well and to
be a promising device for short term forecasting (at least in the
chemical industry).'0 However, this result is still only a first step
toward an understanding of the basic mechanisms governing the level
of R and D expenditures. Hopefully, it will be a useful first step.
This result suggests that to structure the problem and simplify it
somewhat, it may be a fruitful strategy to regard ad and a12 as the key
variables to be explained in a broader model. The problem then is to
investigate the factors that influence these two parameters. In the
months ahead I shall try to do just that.
By taking each of several industries and making interfirm compari-
Sons at various points in time, I shall try to measure the effects of
various factors on a11 and a•2. For example, a12 may depend on a firm's
profitability and size. Naturally, the extent to which data are available
year [i.e. that =R1(t—1)21R1(t—2)].The root-mean-square error for the forecasts
in Table 2 is 1.48. It is 3.61 for the first type of naive forecast, 2.24 for the second type,
and 2.2 for the third type.
10Ofcourse, one would need a forecast of next year's sales for the firm or the industry.
But such forecasts are now collected in various surveys. Moreover, it may be that
provides almost as good an approximation to the forecast as S1(t). There are also the
usual problems of aggregation if one is interested in using a single equation to forecast
for the entire industry. But these problems may not be so very troublesome here.
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will determine how thoroughly some of the relevant hypotheses can be
tested.
Moreover, I will try to measure the effects of certain variables that
might cause differences over time in the parameters for a given firm.
Although equation 3 may be useful for short term forecasting, it is
unlikely to be of value over longer periods because a-1anda12are
likely to change with time. For example, a12maydepend on factors
such as the tightness of the market for research personnel, and a11may
depend on tax rates and the anticipated profitability of research.
To sum up, this model provides a good representation of the data
available thus far. If further work shows it fits data for other firms
(and other industries) equally well, it may be quite useful for short
term forecasting. Moreover, it may also be a worthwhile first step
toward the construction of a more fundamental model explaining the
level of R and D expenditures in a firm or industry. The investigation
that will soon be under way of inter-firm and temporal differences in
the parameters should bring us closer to this goal.
COMMENT
CHARLES J. HITCH, The RAND Corporation
The papers and the discussants have expressed many views on the
productivity of research and development. As we all know, Griliches
has measured it in one instance and come up with a formidable number
(but he does not include the cost of unsuccessful research in his
denominator). Minasian succeeds in "explaining" interfirm differences
in profits in one industry by differential research activity; others have
made similar attempts in other industries with negative results.
Arrow has given us reasons for believing that the social productivity
of development (and especially of research) is higher than the appro-
priable private productivity, but he makes no attempt to estimate
either quantity. At one extreme, several discussants have referred to
industrial research and development as a "fashion" whose main
purpose is to impress the stock buying public, and wondered out loud
whether, in the aggregate, it is worth the cost. Machiup, in particular,
wonders whether more of it is worth the marginal cost, which is a
great deal higher than the average cost.
I can present no numbers to reconcile these divergent views but
there is, I think, some relevant empirical evidence from an industry
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that has spent and is spending very heavily on research and develop-
ment; namely, the military industry. By whatever arbitrary index of
military power one measures the productivity of this industry, it has
increased since World War II not by a few percentage points per
annum but by many orders of magnitude. And it has increased not
because of a larger allocation of resources or their more efficient use
within given technological state-of-the-art constraint, but because of
technological progress stemming from a very large, deliberate, and
expensive research and development program. By far the most im-
portant factor has been the successful development and later improve-
ment of, first, fission and then fusion bombs. But many other develop-
ments have also contributed in a major way; for example, those in
delivery vehicles, guidance techniques, and radar. To mention just one
example which does not depend on nuclear energy, we have developed
antiaircraft missiles which could annihilate a World War II style
bomber raid.
This tremendous increase in our military power, measured in an
absolute sense, has been obscured by the fact that the Russians, with
a similar reliance on research and development, have increased their
power to perhaps a greater extent, so that during part of this period
our relative power has been declining. We are pessimistic about air
defenses in spite of our great progress because qualitative improve-
ments in air offense have proceeded even more rapidly.
Nevertheless, if we had not spent lavishly on military research and
development, if we had used the same funds to acquire additional
World War II type forces, our relative power would have declined
much more precipitously. In fact, we should scarcely be participating
in the race.
I have tried to think of some reason why the military industry
should be unique in this respect but I cannot. Throughout most of
history military technology has advanced very slowly, as in most other
industries, sparked by more or less chance inventions at widely
separated intervals. What has been new since 1940 has been the
deliberate, seeking of inventions within the framework of billion
dollar research and development programs. Perhaps somewhat similar
measures would produce similar results in some other industries.
Perhaps the divergence between social productivity and private
productivity in research and development is a matter of great and
general practical significance.
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